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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
JOE F. JIRON, 
Defendant/Appellant : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 930640-CA 
The Defendant, Joe F. Jiron, through counsel, petitions the Utah Court of 
Appeals, in accordance with Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for 
a Rehearing of the above entitled appeal based upon the following arguments. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
1. After the submission by the parties of an appellant's brief, a response 
brief by the State and a reply brief by the appellant, the Utah Court of Appeals 
rendered it's decision, filed September 27, 1994, affirming Jiron's conviction of 
murder and arson (248 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah App. 1994). 
2. On October 11, 1994, Jiron filed a motion for an extension of time 
to file a petition for rehearing with the Utah Court of Appeals. Based upon an 
extension of time granted by the Court, by Order dated October 14, 1994, Jiron 
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has until November 14, 1994, in which to file a Petition for Rehearing pursuant to 
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 
AND ARSON. 
In addressing Jiron's contention that the evidence as presented at trial was 
insufficient to warrant conviction, this Court, in its opinion stated: 
After a careful review of the evidence, we conclude that there is 
evidence from which all the elements of the crimes can be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
248 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. 
The only specific recitation of the facts that allegedly support the verdict are 
set out at the beginning of the Court's Opinion. The facts as recited therein omit 
key evidence: 
1. The opinion omits the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Fred C. Jensen 
(the first person on the scene by nearly one hour) that he had extensive experience 
in emergency procedures and in handling dead bodies and that he felt a pulse in 
Shelly Jiron's neck when he arrived (Tr. Vol. I at 76-77, 78). 
2. The opinion omits key testimony relating to the time of death. Mr. 
Jensen testified that he could not detect any rigor mortis (Tr. Vol. I at 82-83). 
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After being subjected to temperatures of less than 20 degrees for nearly an hour, 
the paramedics described Shelly Jiron's body only as "clavey." Mr. Andreason, 
the field medical examiner noted only slight rigor mortis and lividity late that 
evening when he examined the body (Tr. Vol. II at 295). The doctor estimated the 
time of death at 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. on December 17, 1991 (Tr. Vol. V at 
1129-1131). The medical testimony itself indicated the unreliability of the 
evidence (Tr. Vol. V at 1177-1178); Tr. Vol. VI at 1268-1272, 1273-1275). 
3. This Court's previous opinion ignored the uncontroverted evidence and 
testimony of the law enforcement personnel that Shelly Jiron's vehicle left the road 
and travelled approximately 750 feet without significant braking (Tr. Vol. I at 99, 
106, 109). 
4. In reciting the facts, this Court's opinion began with Jiron leaving for 
work on December 16. However, it omits the relevant facts that Jiron and his 
wife, Dawn, had been separated as much as they were together and that there were 
no unusual events that preceded the occurrences on December 16 (Tr. Vol. II at 
334-335). While Jiron left his wife with instructions that would relate to a 
separation or divorce, there is no evidence of any hostility either to Dawn or to 
Shelly Jiron. To the contrary, the evidence is uncontroverted that Jiron called 
Shelly from Springville because of car trouble and that Shelly picked him up in her 
car. Shelly told her mother that Joe was having some personal problems and as in 
the past, Shelly was going to help him work them out (Tr. Vol. II at 507). Jiron 
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and Shelly visited Shelly's Mother and Jiron's sister before leaving for Nevada. 
According to his sister, the couple was happy, joking and having a good time (Tr. 
Vol. Ill at 543). The evidence is uncontroverted that Jiron and Shelly stayed in 
Wendover, Nevada, the evening of December 16 and that at 10:11 a.m. on 
December 17, 1991, when Shelly called her sister from Wendover, the couple was 
happy, having a good time, and planning on taking a shower together before going 
to breakfast (Tr. Vol. II at 450; Tr. Vol. Ill at 539-541, 542, 547). 
5. Although this Court's opinion refers to the fact that Jiron and Shelly 
pulled off the road at a secluded location (Tr. Vol. Ill at 650), the opinion omits 
the fact that a pair of ladies underwear was found there together with toilet paper, 
the victim's cigarette butts and absolutely no evidence of any violence (Tr. Vol. Ill 
at 652-656; Tr. Vol. IV at 989-990, 995-996). 
6. In discussing the presence of spilled gasoline in Shelly's car that ignited 
causing the fire, this Court's opinion recites that "the investigation eliminated the 
possibility that gas was spilled by accident." 248 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. Mr. 
Halladay's testimony did not have the benefit of Jiron's regained memory that the 
gas can in the back seat tipped over while the parties were engaged in sexual 
intercourse and that the gasoline spilled as he attempted to get a hold of the can 
and bring it into the front seat until the parties returned home. Additionally, 
Halladay acknowledged that the fire could have been ignited by the static electricity 
generated from Shelly taking her sweater off after it became saturated in gas (Tr. 
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Vol. V at 1091). Halladay acknowledged that Jiron's fingerprints were not found 
on any of the matches (Tr. Vol. V at 1061-1068). The only evidence relied upon 
by Halladay is the spill pattern which indicated that the gasoline was spilled as a 
can was taken from the back seat to the front seat. That explanation did not 
eliminate, and in fact, included, Jiron's explanation, offered in support of his 
motion for a new trial. 
7. This Court's factual recitation of the medical evidence omits facts central 
to causation. One of the key issues was obviously whether Shelly was alive when 
the fire was set. The State contended that Jiron had already killed her. Skin 
Slippage was noted on Shelly's body which Dr. Gruwell testified constituted 
"blistering" evidencing that Shelly was alive at the time of the fire (Tr. Vol. VI at 
1293). Although Dr. Leis initially disagreed, he finally admitted that the blisters 
could have occurred before or after death (Tr. Vol. VI at 1367-1369, 1373-1374). 
Contrary to the conclusion in this Court's opinion, the doctor testified that the anal 
injuries were due to sexual activity and probably caused by an object such as a fist 
or ring (Tr. Vol. V at 1114-1115). There was also evidence of soot fragments in 
Shelly's epiglottis evidencing a respiratory effort to inhale air (Tr. Vol. V at 1193-
1196). In addition, both doctors increased levels of toluene and xylene in the 
vitreous fluid of the eye indicating that the victim inhaled gasoline vapors that 
entered her blood stream while she was alive (Tr. Vol. V at 1127-1128, 1172-
1174). Finally, although testifying that the cause of death was asphyxia, Dr. Leis 
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acknowledged that he could not determine if it had been caused by smothering, 
suffocation, or strangulation (Tr. Vol. V at 1186). None of the typical signs of 
strangulation were found (Tr. Vol V. at 1148-1152). The injuries found on Shelly 
either individually or cumulatively were not life threatening (Tr. Vol. V at 1168-
1169). The only explanation given by the doctors as to how Shelly could have 
died by asphyxia was that of Dr. Gruwell who testified that Shelly could have 
choked by a substance being ingested and getting past the epiglottis and then being 
introduced into the trachea, causing a spasm of the epiglottis closing the area over 
the trachea (Tr. Vol. VI at 1296-1299, 1300). 
The record is devoid of any evidence of any violent behavior of Jiron at all. 
The evidence fails to establish any motive for a violent act by Jiron on Shelly's 
person. Although Jiron and his wife, Dawn, were having difficulties, all of the 
evidence relating to the relationship between Shelly and Jiron, at the time Shelly 
died, indicated that they were good friends and lovers without any evidence of 
hostility. 
As noted below, the culmination of the State's use of innuendo was the 
introduction of the love letter from Norman, Shelly's friend. It was admitted at 
trial without any proof, by eye witnesses or forensic evidence, that Jiron ever 
touched, read or knew about the letter. Even if Jiron had read the letter, there is 
absolutely nothing in the record that would indicate that he, who was still married 
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himself, would deem himself in a position to violently react to the fact that Shelly 
Jiron received such a letter. 
The evidence established that the victim, Shelly Jiron called Abelina Hunick 
at 10:11 a.m. on the morning of December 17, from Wendover still contemplating 
showering with the Defendant and eating breakfast. The accident occurred on the 
west side of Utah Lake that evening at about 7:00 p.m. There is no evidence of 
what transpired between those times with the exception of the evidence found at 
the "second site." It is apparent that the parties stopped at that location, had sex 
and talked while Shelly smoked several cigarettes. Again, there was no evidence 
of violence or any altercation between the parties. 
There is no question that the fire occurred while the car was proceeding 
down the highway, causing Jiron to lose control and travel the nearly 750 feet to 
the final resting spot. When Mr. Jensen found the vehicle, it was still warm 
inside. 
Given the fact that the fire occurred while Jiron and Shelly traveled down 
the road together, the issue relating to the time of death is important. Dr. Leis 
testified that he estimated the time of death to be eight and a half hours, give or 
take an hour prior to the time the core temperature was obtained, at 10:05 p.m. 
That calculation would put the time of death from 12:30 to 2:30 p.m., 
approximately five to six hours before the accident. Obviously, that opinion is in 
conflict with Mr. Jensen who felt a pulse when he first examined the occupants of 
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the car. Dr. Leis testified that if the person had a reasonable degree of medical 
training, the evidence from the witness on the scene would be more reliable. As 
outlined in the statement of facts, Mr. Jensen had considerable experience in 
emergency procedures and dealing with dead bodies. Both doctors testified that the 
normal calculation of time of death derived from the core temperature would be 
affected by outside temperature, clothing and other factors. Inasmuch as no one 
was able to establish those factors, the time of death testimony is simply 
speculation. There is significant testimony that Shelly Jiron was alive at the time 
of the fire and the accident. The only testimony to the contrary is the core 
temperature evidence which was not only conflicting but unreliable because it was 
affected by elements of outside temperature, clothing and the like which were 
unknown factors and could not be taken into account by the doctors. 
The examination of the body also produced no definitive evidence of foul 
play. Dr. Leis concluded that the cause of death was asphyxia or deprivation of 
oxygen. Dr. Leis agreed that the mechanism of the death could not be determined. 
The doctor testified that all of the wounds and injuries on the body were not life 
threatening. In summary, Dr. Leis testified that the pre-death injuries were 
hemorrhages to the back of the neck, the anal injuries and the petechiae. The only 
post-death injuries were slippage of the skin and on cross-examination, Dr. Leis 
testified that those could have been produced before or after the time of death. 
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There was conflicting testimony on natural causes of death producing 
asphyxia. The only theory advanced by the prosecution was that Shelly Jiron, after 
having sex with the Defendant was suffocated by him, even though there was no 
evidence of a physical scuffle at the "second site." Additionally, there was no 
evidence of fighting or injuries to Jiron or to Shelly's body consistent with the 
movements of a person who is being strangled. It is Jiron's position, that a finder 
of fact, to come to the conclusion that the Defendant intentionally and knowingly 
caused Shelly Jiron's death, had to engage in total speculation. Each of the 
elements set out above can be construed to fit a number of factual scenarios that do 
not involve foul play. 
The evidence concerning the fire investigation is important. Mr. Halladay 
testified that the gasoline spill appeared to be a pour consistent with a person 
starting with the can in the back seat and pouring gasoline on the cars seat as he 
brought his hand forward. However, that scenario is as consistent with the 
detection of the gas can in the back seat spilling and an attempt to reach back and 
get the can and replace a lid or stop the spill. The State's theory is advanced by the 
presence of the book of matches and individual matches that had been torn from 
the book. However, no evidence was found that Jiron handled the match book or 
matches. Furthermore, the victim used matches to light her cigarettes. The only 
lighter found was introduced late in the trial and the evidence that it had been 
located even in the vehicle was suspect. The State's expert testified that the gas 
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spill in the car could have been ignited by a small amount of electricity, equivalent 
to the amount from a static electric shock or that put off by a woman taking off a 
sweater. 
The evidence in this case is clearly insufficient when compared to the 
quantum of proof required in other homicide cases. See Appellant's Brief at 48-
52. There simply is not sufficient evidence, including reasonable inferences that 
would support the verdict. State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED UPON NEWLY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
Prior to this Court's decision opinion in this case, there was no Utah 
precedent detailing the necessary showing for a Rule 59 motion claiming that 
amnesia prevented the introduction of evidence and testimony at trial. Jiron, 
because of an absence of general case law on the subject and the total vacuum of 
authority in Utah, prepared a stipulation that was accepted by the State of Utah. 
The stipulation of the parties constituted the entire quantum of proof offered on the 
subject with the exception of the defendant's own testimony that his memory had 
been affected. 
In its opinion, this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jiron's motion 
for a new trial based upon the defendant's failure to show due diligence. 
Specifically, this Court has held that: 
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Jiron had the burden to establish that he was in fact suffering from amnesia 
and that his memory would not return except through the passage of time . . 
248 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should allow the remand of this 
case in order to allow the defendant to meet the standards that have now been 
announced by the Court. It is respectfully submitted that trial counsel made a good 
faith attempt at establishing the necessary elements and the State certainly did not 
object to the showing that was made. 
As it relates to the sufficiency of the proffered testimony, it is submitted that 
the testimony meets the essential requirements of the Court. Dr. Jeffrey Stoffal, is 
the Director of the University of Utah Burn Center, where the Defendant was 
treated. It is submitted that the proffered testimony assumed that the Defendant 
was suffering from amnesia and was simply trying to offer the possible 
explanations of that condition. Mr. Jiron, as recited at trial, had contended he had 
no memory from the first time he was interrogated by law enforcement officers. 
Inasmuch as the State did not contest the existence of amnesia, there was no reason 
either at trial or when the motions for a new trial were made, to establish the 
elements now set by the Court. 
As outlined in the first point of this memorandum, a vacuum was created by 
the inability of Jiron to testify at the time of trial to the essential details of this 
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case. The reason for his inability to testify was accepted by all parties to be the 
presence of amnesia. Neither the trial court nor the State contested the presence of 
defendant's amnesia at trial or at the time Jiron's motion for a new trial was 
argued. Only the State on appeal, and this Court in it's decision, have questioned 
the presence of amnesia— which Jiron does not now have the chance to factually 
rebut. A fair and complete presentation of the facts can only obtained if thid Court 
allows a new trial to establish the facts that Jiron's amnesia prevented. 
POINT in 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR 
IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE LETTER FROM NORMAN STILLEY 
TO SHELLY JIRON 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court's opinion overlooked the 
significance of the admissibility of the "Love Letter" from Norman Stilley to 
Shelly Jiron. See Appellant's Brief at 71-72. A copy of the letter may be found in 
the Addendum of Appellant's Brief as Exhibit 4. Jiron argues that this Court 
should find that the trial court erred in admitting the letter at trial over Jiron's 
objection (Tr. Vol. Ill at 629). 
Jiron filed a Motion in Limine requesting that the trial court exclude the 
letter (R. 56-60). The court denied the motion (R. 330-33). However, in so 
ruling, the court conditioned the admission of the letter to the establishment of 
intent or motive upon Jiron's "knowing of or reading the letter" (R. 332). Jiron 
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argues that the conditional fact of his "knowing of or reading the letter" was never 
established; and therefore, the letter should not have been admitted at trial. 
Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence establishes that "where the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court 
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support 
a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." Jiron asserts that based upon an 
examination of all the evidence, the jury could not reasonably find the conditional 
fact by a preponderance of the evidence. See Appellee's Brief at 65-66 (quoting 
Huddleston v. United States. 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988)). 
The facts in regards to the letter are as follows: Norman Stilley, a friend of 
Shelly Jiron's at the time of her death, wrote the letter and sealed it in an envelope 
while waiting for Shelly at her Mother's house on December 15, 1991 (Tr. Vol. II 
at 488-490, 505). The next day, December 16, 1991, when Shelly accompanied 
by Joe Jiron arrived at her mother's house to pick up the children, she also picked 
up a diaper bag of the children's things, the letter and two roses left with the letter 
(Tr. Vol. II at 497). Shelly Jiron's Mother, Carma, testified at trial that she did 
not know if Joe Jiron saw the letter or the roses (Tr. Vol. II at 497-98, 501-502). 
On the night of December 17, 1991, when Shelly Jiron's car was found off the 
road an in an embankment, the diaper bag containing the children's things was 
found between Shelly Jiron's chest and knees where an EMT had to "tug hard to 
get it out" (Tr. Vol. I at 203-204). When the contents of the bag were later 
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examined, the letter from Norman to Shelly was found in the opened envelope 
"right near the top" or "just off to the side or in the upper part of the bag" (Tr. 
Vol. I at 182; Tr. Vol. Ill at 627). When found the bag was "we to the touch" 
and "had a strong smell of gasoline to it" (Tr. Vol. Ill at 626, 665). During 
careful forensic examinations of the letter, although fingerprints were obtained on 
the letter, Jiron's fingerprints were not found thereon; however, the forensic expert 
did testify that he could not draw any firm conclusions in regards to whether Jiron 
ever handled the letter (Tr. Vol. V at 998-1000). 
Jiron argues that the evidence evidence presented is not sufficient to support 
the trial court's finding of the fulfillment of the condition that Jiron kne\> of or had 
read the letter because based upon an examination of all the evidence as set forth 
above, the jury could not reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Jiron, in fact, knew of the letter's contents or had read it. Moreover, the trial 
court's admission of the letter was harmful error, the absence of which would have 
resulted in a reasonable liklihood of an outcome more favorable to Jiron. See State 
v. O'NeiL 848 P.2d 694, 699 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 
1993). It was Jiron's supposed jealous reaction to the letter in question that gave 
the State a reason for his alleged violence. Without the letter, the State is left 
without any reasoning to support the claimed homicidal outrage. If the jury had 
not been tainted by the introduction of the letter at trial, a different result would 
have been likely. As a result, Jiron requests that this Court find that the trial court 
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committed harmful error in admitting the letter from Norman StiUey to Shelly 
Jiron; and therefore, Jiron be afforded a new trial. 
SUBMITTED, in Good Faith, this _/^day of November, 1994. 
Steven B. Killpacl^  
Attorney for Jir< 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that two (2) copies of Apellant's Petition for Rehearing were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Kris Leonard 
Assistant Attorney General 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
DATED this /j£ day of November, 1994. 
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